Toward an integrative account of social cognition: marrying theory of mind and interactionism to study the interplay of Type 1 and Type 2 processes by Vivian Bohl & Wouter van den Bos
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 11 October 2012
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00274
Toward an integrative account of social cognition: marrying
theory of mind and interactionism to study the interplay of
Type 1 and Type 2 processes
Vivian Bohl1,2* and Wouter van den Bos3
1 Department of Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy and Semiotics, University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
2 Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
3 Decision Neuroscience Lab, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Edited by:
Bert Timmermans, University
Hospital Cologne, Germany
Reviewed by:
Marc Slors, Radboud University
Nijmegen, Netherlands
Leon De Bruin, Ruhr-University
Bochum, Germany
*Correspondence:
Vivian Bohl, Department of
Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy
and Semiotics, University of Tartu,
Jakobi 2, Tartu 51003, Estonia.
e-mail: vivian.bohl@gmail.com
Traditional theory of mind (ToM) accounts for social cognition have been at the basis of
most studies in the social cognitive neurosciences. However, in recent years, the need
to go beyond traditional ToM accounts for understanding real life social interactions has
become all the more pressing. At the same time it remains unclear whether alternative
accounts, such as interactionism, can yield a sufficient description and explanation of
social interactions. We argue that instead of considering ToM and interactionism as
mutually exclusive opponents, they should be integrated into a more comprehensive
account of social cognition. We draw on dual process models of social cognition that
contrast two different types of social cognitive processing. The first type (labeled Type 1)
refers to processes that are fast, efficient, stimulus-driven, and relatively inflexible. The
second type (labeled Type 2) refers to processes that are relatively slow, cognitively
laborious, flexible, and may involve conscious control. We argue that while interactionism
captures aspects of social cognition mostly related to Type 1 processes, ToM is more
focused on those based on Type 2 processes. We suggest that real life social interactions
are rarely based on either Type 1 or Type 2 processes alone. On the contrary, we propose
that in most cases both types of processes are simultaneously involved and that social
behavior may be sustained by the interplay between these two types of processes. Finally,
we discuss how the new integrative framework can guide experimental research on social
interaction.
Keywords: social cognition, social interaction, theory of mind, interactionism, dual process theories, Type 1
processes, Type 2 processes
INTRODUCTION
In the past three decades, intensive discussions on social cogni-
tion have taken place in philosophy and in empirical sciences.
Until recently, the so called theory of mind (ToM) approach
(understood as encompassing theory theory (TT), simulation
theory (ST), and their hybrids) has been the dominant theoret-
ical framework. However, the situation has started to change,
partly due to extensive critique of ToM by authors who draw
on phenomenological, enactive, and embodied approaches to
cognition (see e.g., Hutto and Ratcliffe, 2007; Zlatev et al.,
2008; Leudar and Costall, 2009b; De Jaegher et al., 2010). These
critics have pointed out that in order to understand real life
social interactions we need to go beyond traditional accounts
of social cognition. Nevertheless, because the interactionists do
not offer a clear and unified alternative paradigm, it remains
unclear whether the alleged interactionist alternative (understood
broadly as a set of approaches to social cognition that insist on
replacing the traditional ToM paradigm by a new theoretical
framework focusing on embodied and supra-individual aspects
of real life social interactions) can yield a sufficient description
and explanation of social interactions and of social cognition in
general.
The aim of this paper is to argue that ToM and interaction-
ism ought not to be considered as mutually exclusive opponents.
Instead, they should be integrated into a single comprehen-
sive theoretical framework for understanding social cognition. In
order to develop new research questions and hypotheses from
the integrative ToM-interactionist framework, we draw upon dual
process theories of social cognition that contrast two different
types of social cognitive processing. The first type (labeled Type 1)
refers to processes that are fast, efficient, stimulus-driven, and
relatively inflexible. The second type (labeled Type 2) refers to
processes that are slow, cognitively laborious, flexible, and may
involve consciousness. We argue that while interactionism cap-
tures types of phenomena of social behavior mostly related to
Type 1 processes, ToM is more focused on those based on Type 2
processes. We suggest that real life social interactions are rarely
based on either Type 1 or Type 2 processes alone; on the contrary,
we propose that in most cases both processes are simultaneously
involved and that social behavior moreover may be sustained by
the interaction between these two types of processes. From this
line of reasoning a new challenge for the research of social cogni-
tion emerges: the need to study the interplay between Type 1 and
Type 2 processes in social interactions.
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The paper is divided into several parts. In section “Theory of
Mind and Interactionism” we introduce the theoretical frame-
work of the traditional ToM accounts and outline the interaction-
ist alternative to ToM. Next, in section “ToM or Interactionism?
Both!”, we argue that ToM and interactionism address different
aspects of social cognition and should therefore not be considered
as mutually exclusive paradigms, but rather as complementary.
This is followed by a brief overview of the dual process accounts
in section “The Dual Models of Cognition: Type 1 and Type 2
Processes”. Here we introduce the dual process theories of social
cognition that have been proposed in social psychology and social
neuroscience, and we draw parallels between the Type 1 and
Type 2 processes on the one hand, and the interactionist and
ToM accounts on the other. In “Joining Theory of Mind and
Interactionism to Study Dual Processes” we propose that mar-
rying ToM and interactionism for studying different types of
social cognitive processes leads to building a new comprehen-
sive theoretical framework that raises new interesting research
questions and hypotheses. In “An Integrative Framework” we
outline a new hypothesis, based on the integrative account, that
Type 1 and Type 2 processes can have mutual effects upon each
other during social interactions. Finally, in section “Theoretical
Concerns BecomeMethodological Concerns”, we address some of
the methodological issues that follow from this new approach and
discuss how the integrative framework can guide experimental
research on social interaction.
THEORY OF MIND AND INTERACTIONISM
THEORY OF MIND
The framework of ToM encompasses two theories: TT and ST.
There are several versions of both of them, as well as hybrid ver-
sions that combine the two. The central claim of ToM is that we
understand other people’s behavior by attributing mental states
to them.
According to TT, our ability to attribute mental states to others
as well as to ourselves relies on the use of a specific theory—
folk psychology. Folk psychology postulates mental states (beliefs,
intentions, desires, pains, fears, etc.) as theoretical entities that
are bound together in commonsensical principles and generaliza-
tions, enabling us to explain and predict observable behavior in
mental terms, i.e. to “mindread” or “mentalize”1. The mastering
of folk psychological theory on some level of cognition is taken
to be the fundamental mechanism of social cognition. There are
explicit and implicit versions of TT depending on whether the
use of theory is claimed to be explicit or whether the understand-
ing of others is considered implicitly structured in the form of
a theory. Some theory theorists have defended the idea of “the
child as scientist” where our mental concepts are successively
learned and replaced in development in analogous manner to
scientific change (Astington and Gopnik, 1988; Wellmann, 1990;
Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997; for criticism of this view see Bishop
and Downess, 2002). Others have favored the idea of modular-
ity (Fodor, 1983), arguing that humans have an innate cognitive
module for mindreading (possibly constituted by several sub-
modules) which is separate from the general intellectual capacities
1We use the concepts mindreading and mentalizing interchangeably.
and “ripens” during childhood (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie,
1994; Baron-Cohen, 1995).
According to ST, there is no need for mastering the folk-
psychological theory, since we use our own minds as models
for understanding other minds. We apprehend the mental states
of others by simulating them with the help of our own cogni-
tive mechanisms. There are various versions of ST. Simulation
can either be taken to be a conscious use of imagination and
inference, i.e., mentally putting oneself in the “shoes” of the
other (Goldman, 1989), an explicit but non-inferential process
(Gordon, 1995), an implicit and sub-personal process (Gallese
and Goldman, 1998), or a combination of implicit and explicit
simulation (Goldman, 2006). While the majority of simulation
accounts aim to make empirical claims, Jane Heal has defended a
simulation account of an a priori nature, claiming that thinking
about other minds necessarily involves recreation of the other’s
point of view (Heal, 1998).
As stated above, various authors have also argued in favor of
hybrid versions that combine theorizing and simulation in order
to overcome the problems that each of these theories face by
themselves (e.g., Nichols and Stich, 2003; Goldman, 2006).
COMMON ASSUMPTIONS OF ToM UNDER CRITICISM
Although TT and ST have been developing as rivals, they share
several fundamental assumptions and methodological strategies
(which is why we discuss them under the common label “theory
of mind”)2. In the course of the last decade, the common assump-
tions have been criticized by e.g., Gallagher (2001, 2007, 2008b),
Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), Hutto (2004), Reddy (2008), Reddy
and Morris (2004), Leudar and Costall (2009a), De Jaegher
(2009a,b), De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, 2008), De Jaegher et al.
(2010), and Zahavi (2007, 2008, 2011). Our aim here is not to
reconstruct every argument against ToM that each author has
provided; rather we briefly elucidate the common assumptions of
the ToM accounts that most of these criticisms have pointed out.
According to interactionists, one of the core implications, no
matter which version of TT, ST, or their hybrids we consider, is the
denial of the possibility that we can directly grasp other people’s
mental states (see e.g., Reddy, 2008; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008).
In order to understand others, an explicit or implicit process
of theorizing or simulation is claimed to be necessary, because
mental states are typically conceptualized as “unobservable”3.
Interactionists reject this implication, insisting that we seldom
see bare movements of human bodies; rather, the actions of oth-
ers are already perceived as intelligent behavior (see Zahavi, 2007;
Gallagher, 2008b)4.
2The term theory of mind is used ambiguously in literature. In addition to the
way we use it here, it is sometimes used to denote TT exclusively. In some
contexts, the term theory of mind is used in a very broad sense to refer to an
individual’s ability to understand mental states, in others as well as in oneself.
3This implication does not hold for Gordon’s simulation theory, however. See
Gordon (1995, 2008).
4It does not mean that the only alternative to the unobservability thesis
is behaviorism. Interactionists simply deny that there is a sharp boundary
between observable behavior and mental states, which makes mental states
completely “hidden” from perception. It is, however, debatable, whether giv-
ing up the unobservability thesis would change anything substantial for ToM,
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Another criticized assumption is that of “third-person min-
dreading” being essential for social cognition (see e.g., Gallagher,
2008a). This assumption has two components: the “third-person”
component and the “mindreading” component. The “third-
person” assumption holds that theories designed to explain obser-
vational mindreading from a third-person point of view are
adequate for explaining social understanding in general, includ-
ing interpersonal understanding from a participatory “second-
person” point-of-view. The “mindreading” assumption holds that
mindreading (attribution of mental states to explain or predict
behavior) is pervasive in social cognition. According to inter-
actionism, ToM accounts erroneously assume a rather strong
cocktail of both components, suggesting that the “third-person
mindreading” is first and foremost what social cognition is about.
A final common feature to all ToM approaches is that they
focus on cognitive processes of individuals and pay little attention
to other enabling factors of social cognition, such as context, envi-
ronment, and embodiment. The aim of ToM is to explain what
cognitive processes are responsible for human social cognition.
This aim has been criticized as being excessively individualist and
overly cognitivist because it underestimates the supra-individual5
and embodied aspects of social cognition.
These common assumptions have had strong influence on
the empirical methodology that has been used for testing the
empirical hypotheses of ToM. For example, in the classical false-
belief tasks, test subjects are asked to interpret others’ behavior
by merely looking at a scene as passive observers; they do not
interact with the characters they observe. Interactionists have
pointed out that observational mindreading tasks reveal little
about the processes that are important for participatory social
interactions6.
We will discuss some of the assumptions of ToM to a greater
extent in the next section where we introduce the interactionist
position as based on a critique against ToM.
INTERACTIONISM IN CONTRAST TO ToM
While standard ToM approaches rarely emphasize social inter-
action, it is the heart of the approach that we ascribe to “inter-
actionists”: “[w]hat we call social cognition is first of all social
interaction” (Gallagher, 2008a). Recently, John Michael (2011)
has defined interactionism as referring to a family of positions
endorsing the claim that “social understanding and interaction
as the question of “what are the sub-personal mechanisms that enable us
to perceive the mental states of others?” would still remain. Some propo-
nents of ToM have even stated that their view is compatible with the idea of
observability of mental states (e.g., Carruthers, 1996).
5Supra-individual factors are factors which either lie outside of an individ-
ual or are not reducible to processes inside of an individual, such as e.g.,
physical and social environment, context, temporal dynamics of the situa-
tion, etc. If pressed on this point, proponents of ToM would not deny that
supra-individual factors play a role in social understanding, but according
to interactionism, ToM has downplayed the importance of supra-individual
factors.
6The methodological situation has started to change, presumably due to inter-
actionist criticism. For instance, new “second-person” versions of the standard
false-belief task have recently been developed where experimenters interact
with test subjects in pragmatic contexts (see e.g., the study of Knudsen and
Liszkowski, 2011).
do not require mindreading because various embodied and/or
extended capabilities sustain social understanding and interaction
in the absence of mindreading” (559–560). We will take this defi-
nition as our starting point. However, in order to get a better grip
on what interactionism amounts to, we will look more closely at
how it differs from and contrasts with ToM.
Against cognitivism and individualism
The position of interactionists can be characterized as anti-
individualist7 and anti-cognitivist: social interaction cannot be
fully explained by referring to processes evolving in the minds
(or brains) of individuals while they infer or simulate the unob-
servablemental states of other individuals. In order to understand
social interaction, it is necessary to look at the interaction process
on the supra-individual level as something evolving between sub-
jects (Reddy and Morris, 2004, p. 653) and as something that is
not reducible to each individual’s cognitive input to the process
(De Jaegher et al., 2010). According to interactionism, mindread-
ing can be considered superfluous for social interaction in many
real-life pragmatic contexts, because the interaction process can
be more adequately characterized as participants making sense of
the situation together, rather than participants reacting to each-
other via the “double-screen” of constantly figuring out what the
mental states of the other are.
A thick notion of perception
Interactionism embraces insights from enactivism, which is the
view that cognition first and foremost consists of actively relating
with the environment (see e.g., McGann and De Jaegher, 2009).
From an interactionist point of view, social perception is closely
related to dispositions for social interaction. This is in strong
contrast to standard cognitivist approaches that tend to reduce
human cognition to processes taking place inside the human
brain, while the brain is in turn modeled as a “biological com-
puter” manipulating with representations passively received from
the “outside world.” Hence the concept of perception employed
by interactionists is also different from the concept of percep-
tion that defenders of ToM use, and draws on e.g., the work of
Merleau-Ponty (1945) and Gibson (1979).
While advocates of the ToM approach do not specify their con-
cept of perception, they seem to have a rather narrow notion of
it, given that one of their core assumptions is arguably that the
minds of others are imperceptible. For interactionists, in contrast,
perception is one of their core concepts, being rich both in con-
tent and function: perception does most of the work needed to
understand and interact with others8.
7We distinguish between “radical” and “modest” anti-individualism. While
“radical anti-individualism” is the view that once social cognition is explained
on a supra-individual level, explanations on other levels become superfluous,
“modest anti-individualism” insists that explanations on personal and sub-
personal levels of explanation should be complemented by explanations on
supra-individual level. On our account, all versions of interactionism are at
least modestly anti-individualist, whereas some versions tend to be radical in
their anti-individualism.
8See McGann and De Jaegher (2009) for an enactivist conception of social
perception and Gallagher (2008b) for a direct perception thesis of social
cognition.
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Embodied minds and perceivable mental states
What about the interactionist understanding of mind and men-
tal states? It is not easy to give interactionist account of them, as
these notions do not seem to inherently belong to interaction-
ist vocabulary. However, interactionists often use these concepts
in order to enter into a dialog with the proponents of ToM, or,
more broadly, with analytic philosophers of mind and cognitive
psychologists. In contrast to ToM, interactionists claim that the
mental states of others are not things which are completely hid-
den away or of a solely theoretical nature. The upshot is that in
most everyday social encounters there is little need to figure out,
either explicitly or implicitly, either via folk psychological the-
ory or via simulation, what the hidden mental states of others
behind their behavior are (Zahavi, 2007). We do not normally
perceive others as mindless bodies moving around in physical
space, but rather as persons, mind-body wholes, acting in con-
crete social environments (Zahavi, 2007). One prominent version
of the interactionist thick notion of perception is the so-called
direct perception thesis of social cognition (cf. Gallagher, 2008b),
which states that we can directly perceive some of the mental
states of others (such as emotions or intentions). Interactionists
also criticize ToM for paying too little attention to context and to
embodiment of social agents (Gallagher, 2001; Stawarska, 2006).
For explaining social cognition, it is not enough to find out what
is going on in the brains, because what is going on in the brains
depends on what is going on in the bodies as well as in the physical
and social environments where the bodies are situated9.
The affective dimension of social cognition
According to ToM (especially TT) our epistemic attitude toward
others in its presumed third-person observational format is sim-
ilar to the attitude of scientists toward their research objects.
Interactionists, in contrast, emphasize the importance of affect
and engagement in interpersonal interactions, which is assumed
to give access for the participants to information that is otherwise
much less obvious (Reddy and Morris, 2004, p. 657). Reddy and
Morris even go so far as to state that “[e]ngagement creates the
minds that are there to be known” (Reddy and Morris, 2004, p.
660), which is another way of pointing out that an emotionally
rich relationship is qualitatively different and more fundamental
to our everyday social life than a detached third-person ability to
mindread. Although e.g. ST explains how we can automatically
attribute emotions to other people, it fails to take into account
the attributor’s own emotional reactions as a source of informa-
tion about the social situation. Our own affective responses often
differ from the emotions that we recognize in others; for exam-
ple, when I recognize anger in the other, I may become afraid.
ToM can explain how I recognize anger in the other, but it does
not account for how I become afraid as a result. According to
interactionism, our affective responses play an important role for
9Some proponents of ToM, especially simulationists (e.g. Goldman, 2006), do
consider the bodily aspects of others’ behavior as important, but they view the
observable bodily aspects of behavior as merely another type of input for min-
dreading. This approach is not satisfactory from the enactive and embodied
point of view, which takes cognition to be much more deeply bodily struc-
tured. e.g., it is claimed that our sensory-motor system directly responds to
others’ behavior without any mediation via mentalizing.
social interaction and they should be studied as a part of social
cognition.
ToM OR INTERACTIONISM? BOTH!
THE BLIND SIDE OF RADICAL INTERACTIONISM
In general, interactionists have been rebelling against the
monopoly of ToM over social cognition research. In doing so,
some of them, that we refer to as radical interactionists, have
insisted on a radical “interactive turn” in order to completely
replace the framework of ToM with the new interactionist frame-
work (see e.g., De Jaegher et al., 2010; De Jaegher, 2009a,b)10. It
would thus appear that radical interactionists are falling into the
same trap as ToM arguably faithfuls. They seemingly intend to
monopolize social cognition research by suggesting to ignore the
part of social cognition that is particularly human—the ability for
abstract reasoning about other people’s mental states.
At this point, it is crucial to distinguish between the differ-
ent aims of social cognition research envisioned by interactionists
and proponents of ToM. Asking the general question of how
to explain human social cognition is different from the more
specific issue of what individual cognitive (neural and psycho-
logical) mechanisms appertain to social cognition. According to
interactionists, the advocates of ToM make the mistake of equat-
ing these two questions. At the same time, radical interactionists
seem to make a similar mistake by claiming that explaining social
cognition is a matter of detecting and explaining the percep-
tual and supra-individual processes that constitute real life social
interactions.
Some of the radical interactionists are also radical anti-
individualists, downplaying the importance of individual mech-
anisms in social cognition. For example, De Jaegher et al. (2010)
argue that the interaction process itself can be seen as an enabling
and constitutive factor for social cognition and should thereby
be given an explanatory role in the theory. They go as far as
to state that “[. . . ] we can conceive of interaction dynamics as,
in some cases, delivering the necessary cognitive performance.
There is no need to duplicate their effects by an individual mech-
anism” (De Jaegher et al., 2010). It is not obvious what the
statement amounts to, but we interpret it as a claim that individ-
ual explanations become superfluous once the interaction process
is explained on the supra-individual level. We agree that social
interaction is not reducible to the individual neural or cognitive
processes; however, individual processes still remain a part of the
whole story. We propose that a more promising approach would
be a multi-layered account of a mechanistic nature (see Bechtel,
2008). It would enable us to give explanations on different levels
(sub-personal, personal/individual, supra-individual)11 instead of
10Less radical interactionists admit that in some cases (e.g., if the behavior of
the other puzzles us) we may rely on simulation or theorizing, so they do not
insist on ruling out themindreading paradigm completely (see e.g., Gallagher,
2008b).
11In cognitive science it is a commonplace to distinguish between personal
and sub-personal levels of explanation. This distinction goes back to Dennett
(1969). The general idea is that the personal level deals with persons and
their behavior and includes intentional vocabulary (e.g., “feels pain/intends to
open the window/is angry” are personal level descriptions), whereas the sub-
personal level deals with cognitive and neural mechanisms that serve different
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arguing in favor of reductionism either of a sub-personal, individ-
ualist, or supra-individualist kind. It would also require the study
of the links between the different levels of explanation.
Another vulnerable aspect of interactionism is that it tends
to over-emphasize social interactions that are honest, smooth,
and cooperative. It might well be the case that in situations
where social interaction evolves smoothly in the direction that is
agreeable for all participants, there is little need for the partici-
pants to bother with attributing mental states to others based on
either simulation or inference. But it is questionable whether this
is the case in situations of competition, disagreement, conflict,
or obvious misunderstandings. It is surely possible that people
sometimes observe other people from a purely third-person point
of view and, moreover, attribute mental states to others to gain a
better understanding of what they are up to.
Also, it is hardly possible to expand the characteristic of per-
ceptibility to all mental states as it is obvious that some mental
states (e.g., thoughts that are not expressed) are less perceivable
than others (e.g., strong emotions), even by interactionist’s stan-
dards. At times we do indeed find ourselves trying to figure out
those more hidden aspects of others’ mental lives. In addition, it
is doubtful that interactionist approaches are able to account for
many linguistic forms of interaction (e.g., those requiring Gricean
assumptions about communicative intentions, see Grice, 1968,
1969), which is a reason to call for a ToM-like complement12.
To conclude the subject, a theory of social cognition should be
able to account for both, the more direct forms of social interac-
tion where no mindreading seems to be necessary, and the more
detached and sophisticated forms of social understanding that
require mindreading.
WHY IS A COMPLEMENTARY ACCOUNT NEEDED?
Recently, a small number of authors have provided different argu-
ments in favor of merging elements of ToM and interactionism
instead of preferring one account over the other (Gangopadhyay
and Schilbach, 2011; Michael, 2011). Our purpose is to expand
upon this general idea in order to tease out new hypotheses for
empirical research, drawing on dual process accounts of social
cognition.
We have tried to demonstrate that while ToM is an indi-
vidualist and a mentalizationist approach, interactionism is in
many respects its antipode in preferring explanations in terms
of embodiment, perception, and supra-individual processes. It
functions in a cognitive system and that can be described in a non-intentional
vocabulary (e.g., “mirror neurons fire”). It makes sense to say e.g., “I feel
angry” and “lateral orbitofrontal cortex is active” but it does not make sense
to say “my brain feels angry” or “I activated my lateral orbitofrontal cortex.”
Whereas explicit ToM operates on the personal level (it is the person who the-
orizes over or simulates the other person’s behavior), implicit ToM serves as a
middle ground between personal level and sub-personal neural level—it gives
functional explanations on the sub-personal level in an intentional vocabulary
(e.g., “mirror neurons are mechanisms for simulating the actions of another
individual”). The exact relation between different levels is a much debated
issue and it is not possible to give a detailed account on it here (but see e.g.,
Colombo, 2012 for a recent account on the matter). However, we assume that
explanations on different levels should be considered as mutually informative.
See also footnote 5.
12We are grateful to one of the reviewers for bringing this to our attention.
seems, however, that ToM and interactionism may describe dif-
ferent aspects of social cognition. The important issue is therefore
not asking whether ToMor interactionism is right, but rather ask-
ing what aspects of social cognition do these approaches capture
and how are these different aspects related.
Interestingly, it seems that both ToM and interactionism aim
to give alternative explanations to the same empirical findings
(e.g., developing alternative accounts of the function of mir-
ror neurons or interpreting developmental studies differently),
but often they also refer to different empirical studies (cf. e.g.,
Goldman, 2006 and Reddy, 2008). This suggests that perhaps
both approaches are right and wrong at the same time—right in
some of what they state and wrong in some of what they deny.
The important but difficult task is to figure out those elements
from each approach that have got some aspect of social cog-
nition right, and to see how they relate to elements that other
approaches have captured. The way we see it, interactionism is
looking at aspects of social cognition that seem to be more basic
for social cognition, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically,
and that we possibly share with other species. ToM concentrates
on higher and specifically human traits of social cognition. It is as
if these two sides focus on different layers of human social cog-
nition. And indeed, there are several dual models of the human
mind that have the potential to accommodate the insights of
both, ToM and interactionism. We will turn to these in the next
section.
THE DUAL MODELS OF COGNITION: TYPE 1 AND TYPE 2
PROCESSES
DUAL PROCESS MODELS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND IN SOCIAL
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Many everyday tasks in our lives require high speed and effec-
tiveness of processing on the one hand, and great flexibility
together with executive control on the other. Social interaction is
no exception. Empirical evidence demonstrates that these char-
acteristics do not fit well together, so how can coping in these
tasks be explained? We favor a dual process approach to social
cognition13.
Several recent cognitive models for social cognition in psy-
chology and social cognitive neuroscience contrast two different
processing types labeled e.g., lower level vs. higher level (Apperly,
2011, see also Apperly and Butterfill, 2009), automatic vs. con-
trolled (Adolphs, 2009), implicit vs. explicit (Frith and Frith,
2008), pre-reflective vs. reflective (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007),
low level vs. high level (Goldman, 2006) or reflexive vs. reflective
(Lieberman et al., 2002; Lieberman, 2003).
The existence of numerous differently labeled but analogous
dual process accounts is partly the result of the fact that many
of them have been proposed in narrow fields of research inde-
pendently of each other (e.g., in cognitive psychology and in
13Dual process accounts have been proposed by a great number of authors
in a variety of cognitive domains, such as artificial intelligence, general rea-
soning, judgment, number cognition, memory, and social cognition. Here the
discussion is restricted to dual process models of social cognition. In social
psychology, the earliest models of dual processing date back to the 1980s; see
e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken and Trope, 1999.
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social psychology, see Evans, 2010) and partly a result of every
author’s individualistic aim to offer an account that can be dif-
ferentiated from other similar accounts. For the purposes of
building a general integrative theoretical framework, we refrain
from preferring one particular dual process theory over oth-
ers and concentrate on the core of what these theories have
in common. As Evans (2012) has pointed out: “there is [cur-
rently] both a broad consensus about the basic distinctions
as well as lively debate about the specific nature of the two
kinds of processing.” We use the terms “Type 1 processes” and
“Type 2 processes” as general labels for the two types of sub-
personal processes outlined by different dual process models.
Other labels, such as “System 1/System 2” (Stanovich, 1999)
or “intuitive mind/reflective mind” (Evans, 2010), have also
been used for speaking about dual processes in general, but
“Type 1/Type 2” seems to be the most neutral choice of terms
and is therefore preferable, as Evans (2012) and Stanovich and
Toplak (2012) have also pointed out. It is unlikely that the
two types of processes map on only two cognitive systems (see
Evans, 2008, and Keren and Schul, 2009), which is why we
speak about two types of processes instead of two cognitive
systems.
Type 1 processes are typically described as fast, efficient,
stimulus-driven, and relatively inflexible. They place hard con-
straints on what information is considered or how it is processed
to gain high efficiency and speed at the expense of low flexibil-
ity. These processes are thought to be closely linked with affect
and their outcome is usually experienced as perceptions or feel-
ings. Several authors have also pointed out that Type 1 processes
might be evolutionarily older and shared with other species.
Type 2 refers to a type of information processing that is relatively
slow and cognitively laborious, making the opposite trade-off by
being relatively flexible. The Type 2 processes typically involve
some combination of effort, intention, and awareness. The pro-
cesses tend to interfere with one another, and their outcome is
sometimes experienced as self-generated thoughts. The Type 2
processes are thought to be responsible for explicit reasoning and
to have no direct link with emotion. As such, they are consid-
ered to be evolutionarily more recent and uniquely developed in
humans. (See e.g., Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Evans and Frankish,
2009; Evans, 2010; Apperly, 2011).
The typically correlated characteristics listed above should
not, however, be considered as necessarily co-occurring features
(Stanovich and Toplak, 2012). The dual process theoreticians
have recognized the need to go beyond simply listing vari-
ous dichotomous characteristics and emphasize the importance
of finding operationalizable defining features for distinguishing
between the two types of processing. There is more than one
promising proposal on the matter. Evans (2008) has suggested
that “Type 2 processes are those that require access to a sin-
gle, capacity-limited central working memory resource, while
Type 1 processes do not require such access.” Stanovich and
Toplak (2012) have recently come up with a slightly different
proposal, claiming that “autonomous processing is the defining
feature of Type 1 processing” and “the key feature of Type 2
processing is the ability to sustain the decoupling of secondary
representations.”
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a fair
review on the wealth of the dual process accounts and their
critiques14, but several detailed overviews are available (e.g.,
Lieberman, 2007; Evans, 2010). In the following, we will focus on
some of the most important features of the two types of process-
ing that have been frequently emphasized in connection to social
cognition.
MIRRORS AND MENTALIZING
Dual process accounts of social cognition have emerged indepen-
dently in the social neurosciences. Recent neuroscientific research
suggests that the understanding of others’ intentions is supported
by two neural systems that perform complementary roles; the mir-
ror neuron system (MNS) and the mentalizing or theory of mind
system (ToMS). The MNS is thought to support the direct under-
standing of the intentions of the actions of others (Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia, 2010). In the human brain, the MNS is often associ-
ated with the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and premotor areas in
the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Based on the initial findings
that the MNS is activated when performing actions and when
observing same kind of actions performed by another individ-
ual, it was viewed as support for implicit forms of ST (Gallese and
Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2006). However, as discussed below
(section “Interactionism vs. Implicit ToM), there are good rea-
sons to question this interpretation. Alternatively, interactionism
suggests that these processes are perceptual in nature. We will not
try to resolve these issues in the present paper, but we do want
to point out that regardless of whether these processes represent
implicit simulation or perceptual processes, most will agree that
the processes associated with the MNS are highly automatic, fast,
and pre-conscious, thus fitting the broad description of Type 1
processes.
14We want to highlight one issue that is often raised by critics of dual process
models: the fact that when we learn certain skills (e.g., learn to drive), we seem
to move from deliberative Type 2 processes toward more automatic Type 1
processes. This can be seen as a problem for dual process accounts, because it
suggests either a gradient between Type 1 and Type 2 processes or a magical
translation from Type 1 to Type 2 processes. The issue is beyond the scope of
the current paper, but because of its importance, we address it briefly by draw-
ing on the richer field of the neuroscience of learning. Numerous studies have
shown that there are different learning mechanisms operating in parallel, and
thesemechanisms are associated with different brain systems (for an overview,
see Balleine et al., 2008). Although these studies concern mainly very sim-
ple reward based learning paradigms, theymight tell us something interesting
about the learning of social skills. These studies make a distinction between
goal oriented and habit learning systems. Whereas initially both systems are
involved in behavior, after a certain amount of practice, the individual may
rely on the habit system alone. Even though some skills can be learned by the
habit system alone, other more complex behaviors need the initial presence
of the goal-oriented system. Furthermore, relying on the habit system is pos-
sible only as long as the environment is very stable, e.g., if a person moves
to another country, she might need to learn new social skills and inhibit the
old ones. Although it may seem that during the learning process the behav-
ior becomes gradually more automatic, this does not necessary imply that
there is a gradient from Type 1 to Type 2 processes; it can just as well be
the result of the relative contribution of Type1 and Type 2 processes. To what
extent this line of reasoning applies to social skill learning remains an open
question, which opens up some very interesting avenues for research in social
neuroscience.
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Although the MNS is thought to underlie the understanding
of fairly complex motor intentions, it also has its limitations. For
instance, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia claim that “[u]nderstanding
the reasons behind an agent’s motor intention requires additional
inferential processes” (2010, p. 271). Whilst we can directly grasp
that someone intends to pick up a book from the table, the MNS
is not thought to provide us with an understanding of the rea-
sons that underlie that motor intention (for example, the wish to
read the book, to put it back on the shelf or to bring it back to the
library).
Generally, this distinction in action understanding corre-
sponds to the difference between proximal and distal intentions,
terms that are typically used in philosophy of action (Pacherie,
2008). It is generally believed that inferring distal intentions
involves the activation of the ToMS, which is associated with a
different set of cortical areas, minimally including the tempo-
ral parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial wall of the prefrontal
cortex (mPFC) (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2007).
These areas have shown to be associated with several tasks that
involve inferring intentions of others from a third person per-
spective (e.g., understanding cartoons or stories). Neuroimaging
data does not provide further insight into what type of process-
ing takes place in this network, but it can be hypothesized that
this network subserves Type 2mindreading processes. Within the
social neurosciences, the ToM network is often associated with
the explicit type of inferential processes, thereby fitting the broad
description of Type 2 processes. In sum, these two systems fit the
general division of Type 1 and Type 2 processes15.
Our aim is not to give an exhaustive overview of all pro-
cesses or brain areas involved in social cognition (for extensive
reviews see Lieberman, 2007; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011); how-
ever, we do want to point out two additional networks that have
been consistently reported in social neuroscience research and are
important for the current discussion. Firstly, the non-primary
sensory areas in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)
and the fusiform gyrus (FFG). Human and animal studies have
associated the pSTS with the initial sensory analysis of social sig-
nals, such as gaze direction (for review see Nummenmaa and
Calder, 2009). The FFG, or specifically the fusiform face area
(FFA), is thought to support the recognition of face identity. The
output of these processes in these areas is thought to be input for
both the MNS and the ToMS. Secondly, recent developments in
social neuroscience have built upon the idea of shared represen-
tations in the MNS and extended this notion to mechanisms for
understanding others’ emotions (Decety, 2010). Indeed, numer-
ous studies have shown that similar or overlapping brain areas,
such as the insula, are activated when processing one’s own and
other people’s emotions (Singer, 2006). Importantly, similarly to
the models of motor resonance, theories of affective resonance
claim that these processes are quick, automatic, and support a
direct way of understanding other people’s emotions (Decety,
2010).
15Note that we use the processes associated with theMNS and ToMS as exam-
ples of Type 1 and Type 2 processes that are involved in social cognition,
these are not meant to be considered exhaustive. For instance, other Type 1
non-MNS processes may exist, such as lower level perceptual processes.
JOINING THEORY OF MIND AND INTERACTIONISM TO
STUDY DUAL PROCESSES
THE PARALLEL BETWEEN INTERACTIONISM vs. ToM DISCUSSION
AND THE TYPE 1 vs. TYPE 2 MODELS OF COGNITION
In this section we argue that there is a viable parallel to be drawn
between the interactionism vs. ToM discussion and the Type 1
vs. Type 2 process models of cognition and that a promising
way for enhancing research on social cognition is to consider
interactionism as emphasizing those aspects of social cogni-
tion that pertain mostly to Type 1 processes, while considering
ToM as emphasizing aspects that typically characterize Type 2
processes.
Interactionism stresses the perceptual and the affective dimen-
sion of social cognition. There is a clear parallel here to Type 1
processes. It is often stated in the dual process models that the
outcome of Type 1 processes is usually experienced as percep-
tions, feelings, or emotions, whereas we have little conscious
control over the processes that lead to these outcomes. The “intu-
itive mind” is considered to be shared across species and it is
thought to be both phylogenetically and ontogenetically older
and therefore more basic than the “reflective mind” (Evans,
2010). Interactionism resonates with these aspects by claiming to
address those more primitive and presumably more fundamen-
tal aspects of social cognition that are largely ignored by the ToM
approach.
On the other hand, standard accounts of ToM aim to find
out what makes human social cognition distinctively human (see
e.g., Saxe, 2006; Penn and Povinelli, 2007). This links directly to
Type 2 processes as they are considered to be evolutionarily more
recent and likely to be uniquely developed in humans (see e.g.,
Stanovich, 1999; Evans, 2010). Proponents of ToM concentrate on
studying higher cognitive capacities such as meta-representation
of other people’s mental states (e.g., by standard false-belief tasks)
of which non-human animals are not capable16. Unlike Type 1
processes, the outcome of Type 2 processes can sometimes be
experienced as self-generated thoughts, whereas the phenomenol-
ogy of explicit mindreading is much closer to reasoning than to
perception. In sum, ToM, especially the explicit versions of it,
points out traits of cognitive processing that are typically ascribed
to Type 2 processes.
The connection between interactionism and the Type 1 pro-
cesses may be more difficult to grasp. Earlier we criticized the ten-
dency of the “radical interactionism” to prefer supra-individual
descriptions over sub-personal explanations where actually both
are needed. If interactionists lack sub-personal explanations for
social cognition then the connection between Type 1 processes
and interactionism is not obvious—after all, Type 1 processes
are processes described on the sub-personal level. Most of the
interactionists, however, do agree that a sub-personal story of
16Chimpanzees and some other primates may be a possible exception. The
issue of whether higher non-human animals are capable of some primitive
form of mindreading has been a controversial matter since the end of 1970’s
and is far from being settled (cf. Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Call and
Tomasello, 2008). However, even if e.g., chimpanzees can be considered to
have some kind of ability for mindreading, it is certainly not as sophisticated
as in humans.
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the processes underlying social perception needs to be given as
a part of social cognition theory. We argue that interactionism
has potential to enrich our understanding of the Type 1 pro-
cesses. Firstly, although the explanations given by ToM may seem
plausible for explaining the functions of the Type 2 processes,
the interactionist critique gives good reasons to doubt that the
same explanations are suitable for the Type 1 processes. Secondly,
interactionism provides detailed personal-level descriptions of
social perception which can be used as proper scientific explanan-
dum for the corresponding sub-personal explanations. Thirdly,
interactionism describes supra-individual factors (environment,
context, temporal dynamics of the interaction, embodiment, etc.)
that is thought to facilitate social interaction. From these descrip-
tions, it is possible to derive scientific variables that can be
used in designing experiments for studying the effects of the
“factors outside the skull” on real life social interactions. We
hypothesize that many such variables have an effect particu-
larly on the Type 1 processes, whereas Type 2 processes are less
directly dependent on the current situation and the immediate
surroundings.
INTERACTIONISM vs. IMPLICIT ToM
In relation to the parallels outlined in the previous section, the
question arises: what reasons are there to think that the Type 1
processes should be considered in terms of interactionism rather
than in terms of implicit ToM? Implicit versions of ToM state that
mindreading via theorizing or simulation takes place automat-
ically and tacitly on the sub-personal level of processing. Some
proponents of ToM have made a distinction between two kinds
of mindreading which is similar to the differentiation between
Type 1 and Type 2 processes. For example, Alvin Goldman (2006)
distinguishes between high-level and low-levelmindreading, both
of which rely on some form of simulation of others’ mental states
(for critique of the distinction between two types of mindreading,
see De Vignemont, 2009). This refers to the possibility that some
types of mindreading might be implemented by Type 1 processes.
Though our aim is not to settle this issue here, we would like to
highlight some indicators against ToM accounts (ST in particular)
of Type 1 processes.
Firstly, the concept of simulation involves some specific impli-
cations. For example, speaking of mirror neurons in terms of
simulation implies that there is a primary and a secondary func-
tion for themirror neurons. It is usually assumed that the primary
function for mirror neurons is to contribute to the person’s own
actions and the secondary function is to simulate the actions of
another “off-line”. However, it is possible that the activation of
mirror neurons is not person-specific, so it has only one function;
namely, to represent (a type of) an action as such. Information
about who is the agent of the action may be “tagged” to this
information in a later stage of processing. (see De Vignemont and
Fourneret, 2004; Green, 2012).
Secondly, even if the use of the concept “simulation” were a
good way for speaking about the mirror neurons, this does not
automatically guarantee the success of any form of ST in a strict
sense. ST traditionally implies much more than simply using the
concept of simulation for some sub-personal processes that mat-
ter for social cognition. In principle, one can loosely use the
concept of simulation for the mirroring processes without being
a proponent of any form of ST in a strict sense17,18.
Finally, even if the function of mirror neurons were best
described by ST, the study of the role of these neurons for social
interaction still requires a wider interactionist methodology. In
addition to the observational experiments that have been domi-
nating the field within the ToM framework, mirror neurons and
other cognitive and affective processes need to be studied in real
life situations and in interactive contexts, where interactionists
have argued that specific environmental and contextual factors
may be important for social cognition.
Overall, we argue that it is highly unlikely that all aspects of
social cognition can be explained in the framework of ToM, which
focuses on the issue of how we attribute mental states to oth-
ers. It is more parsimonious and evolutionarily more plausible
to think that not all aspects of human social cognition rely on
mental state ascriptions and to consider the capability for mental
state ascriptions to have evolved from other, more primitive social
abilities that we share with our evolutionary ancestors. ToM was
initially proposed as an account for deliberate reasoning about
other individual’s mental states. As it became clear that peo-
ple do not constantly reason about others’ mental states, which
made explicit versions of ToM unlikely to be correct as general
theories of social cognition, most of themindreading was hypoth-
esized to happen implicitly. Although it is possible that over time
mindreading becomes habitual and carries on automatically on
an implicit level, making implicit mindreading responsible for
all aspects of human social cognition is an evolutionary non-
starter, as it leaves a huge gap between human and animal social
cognition.
All these trains of thought suggest that one should be at least
careful to associate mirror neurons with the ST exclusively and
to consider ToM as an approach that is able to explain all aspects
of human social cognition. Alternative approaches to Type 1 pro-
cesses of social cognition must be considered, especially those that
interactionism has a potential to offer.
To sum up, our basic claim is that there is a coarse-grained
mapping between the Type 1 processes and interactionism on the
one hand, and the Type 2 processes and ToM on the other. We do
not expect this mapping to be clean and perfect—undoubtedly
ToM in passing mentions aspects of social cognition that can be
related to Type 1 processes and vice versa—but in general the
tendencies are rather clear. On the example of how dual pro-
cesses operate in a single brain and complement each other, one
can think of ToM and interactionism as complementary theo-
ries of social cognition in general. The aim of proposing the new
integrative framework is, however, not merely to dissolve the ToM
17The same kind of argument can be used against TT. For example, claiming
that social perception is inferential does not guarantee the success of TT.
18As one of our reviewers pointed out, one might argue that the two points
about the concept of simulation could be met simply by adjusting one’s defi-
nition of simulation. Our point is, however, that the interactionist critique of
ST is not merely verbal—it is not reducible to the issue of whether one should
use the term “simulation” or refrain from using it. Adjusting the definition of
simulation to the extent that it would meet the above criticism would make
the concept of simulation vacuous and would therefore rather weaken than
strengthen the position of ST.
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vs. interactionism opposition, but to generate new research ques-
tions and hypotheses that would help to gain new knowledge on
social cognition and especially on social interaction. In the fol-
lowing section, we outline a hypothesis on the relation of Type 1
and Type 2 processes.
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK
Different dual process accounts for social understanding have
been proposed by several authors over the past 10 years (e.g.,
Lieberman et al., 2002; Kilner et al., 2007; Keysers and Gazzola,
2007; De Lange et al., 2008). However, there is no consensus
on whether and how these two types of processes cooperate and
inform each other. Here we will review different positions com-
monly found in the literature, and argue that real life social
interactions are rarely based on either Type 1 or Type 2 processes
alone. On the contrary, we expect that in many cases of everyday
social encounters both processes are simultaneously involved and
that social behavior may be sustained by the interaction between
these two types of processes.
INDEPENDENT NETWORKS
Some authors have suggested that the MNS and ToMS constitute
independent networks and have complementary roles in social
cognition (e.g., Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Jacob and Jeannerod,
2005; van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). The general idea is
that in most social situations we can rely on the set of low-
level processes to support fluent and effortless social interactions.
However, “[t]here seems [. . . ] to be a transition from the mir-
ror to the mentalizing system [. . . ] when perceived body motions
are contextually inconsistent, implausible, or pretended” (van
Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). In line with interactionism, as pre-
sented by Shaun Gallagher (2008a), this means that the brain
switches fromMNS to ToMSwhen the situation appears puzzling.
Furthermore, van Overwalle and Baetens (2009) argue that
current neuroscientific data supports the hypothesis that both
systems are operating in isolation because most studies in their
meta-analysis showed the involvement of only one of the two sys-
tems. Indeed, many studies have shown that in situations that call
for an observational stance, for instance while reading a novel,
we rely solely on the ToMS (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Similarly,
there are many studies that have shown the sole involvement
of the MNS in tasks involving imitating or passively watching
simple movements. However, this only indicates that there are
contexts in which these systems are able to operate in isolation.
A possible explanation for the pattern of results reported in van
Overwalle and Baetens’ meta-analyses is that the experimental
paradigms, and particularly the lack of real interactions, render
MNS and ToMS to operate in isolation (see also Schilbach et al.,
forthcoming).
TYPE 1 PROCESSES INFORMING TYPE 2 PROCESSES
A more common hypothesis in dual process models in general
is that the Type 1 processes inform and support the Type 2 pro-
cesses (e.g., Blakemore and Decety, 2001). This line of reasoning
follows the logic of classic cognitivist models in which percep-
tual processes are temporally primary, and their outputs feed,
uni-directionally, into cognitive processes. As such, the direct
grasp of motor or proximal intentions (to switch a button) are
used on a higher level to infer distal intentions (e.g., to turn on
the light to read a book).
In line with this idea, some authors have suggested that the
Type 1 processes associated with the MNS are a prerequisite
for the ToM processes (e.g., Ohnishi et al., 2004). Given the
neuroscientific evidence indicating that ToMS has often been
found to operate in isolation from MNS, a strong version of this
claim seems unlikely to be true. However, this does not refute
weaker versions of this claim suggesting that Type 1 processes
are an ontogenetic and/or phylogenetic prerequisite for Type 2
processes (Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1994; De Waal and Ferrari,
2010).
TYPE 2 PROCESSES INFLUENCING TYPE 1 PROCESSES
More recently, evidence has emerged in separate fields of research
to support the idea that higher order (i.e., Type 2) representations
regulate or bias perceptual (i.e., Type 1) processes. Several stud-
ies have already shown that higher order intentions can directly
affect visual perception (Allport, 1987), for instance how we per-
ceive tools is influenced by our intention to use them (Witt et al.,
2005). More importantly, Teufel and colleagues (Teufel et al.,
2009, 2010) have shown that mental state attribution (in this
case the belief about whether the other person could see or not)
also influences gaze-perception and automatic gaze-following.
Based on these results, the authors hypothesize that perceptual
modulation is the result of direct top-down modulation by the
ToMS (Teufel et al., 2010). Additionally, others have suggested
that the ToMS may also directly modulate the MNS (Liepelt and
Brass, 2010; Ondobaka et al., 2012). For instance, Ondobaka et al.
have shown that the motor congruence effect, or the fact that
performing a movement is facilitated when another person is
performing the same movement, is modulated by higher order
mental state attributions. That is, they found that the movement-
congruency effect was present only when participants acted with
the same higher order intention as the co-actor. So in a simi-
lar fashion as our own proximal intentions (to pick up the cup)
are often superseded and influenced by distal intentions (to get
something to drink), our understanding of others also involves
the top-down influence of higher order intentions. These find-
ings are also in line with Jacob’s alternative interpretation of
the function of MNS which suggests that the MNS by itself is
responsible not for the ascriptions of even the most simple inten-
tions, but rather for computing “the motor commands from a
representation of the agents prior intention” (Jacob, 2008); the
intentions are thought to be computed by other means. On the
other hand, Jacob also states that “the application of the con-
cept of grasping triggered by the perception of an act of grasping
would inferentially give rise to the related concept of, e.g., drink-
ing” (Jacob, 2009), thus subscribing to the idea that the reciprocal
interaction between these different systems may be essential in
social understanding. In sum, these experiments also suggest that
the engagement and top down influence of the putative ToMS
is not only engaged when there is some incongruence in the
social environment, but may also operate on whatever knowl-
edge is available in order to make social interactions run more
efficiently.
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RECIPROCAL INFLUENCE
Taken together, the social neuroscience literature suggests that
intentions are processed (and understood) at different levels of
abstraction by different types of processes and that there are recip-
rocal interactions between these types of processing. Inspired by
the predictive coding theory of the MNS (Kilner et al., 2007) we
hypothesize that the MNS and the ToMS often operate in paral-
lel; both function to enable predictions of behavior, which in turn
facilitates social interactions. Furthermore, as is also suggested by
dual process models, it is the interaction between different types
of social cognitive processes that allows social behavior to be fast
and effective, and at the same time flexible and context-dependent
(Kilner et al., 2007; Evans, 2010).
Thus, although we fully agree that the “dynamic interaction
between [distal] and [proximal] intentions modulates the pro-
cessing of the observed actions of other people” (Ondobaka et al.,
2012, p. 34), we also suggest that the processing of observing
actions of others contributes to social interactions. Mindreading
as implemented by the ToMs is therefore also in the service of
interpersonal interaction (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005). In this
sense the view marries the ToM assumption that mindreading is
important for social cognition with the interactionist assumption
that social cognition is first of all social interaction.
From this integrative account, two major conclusions for the
interdisciplinary study of social cognition follow. Firstly, it fol-
lows that although it is possible to study processes emphasized by
ToM and interactionism in isolation from each other, if we want
to know how social cognition functions in real-life, we should
rather study how these different processes influence one another.
Secondly, in order to study the interaction between Type 2 (ToM)
and Type 1 (interactionism) processes, we need to study actual
social interactions and how these unfold over time. Figure 1
illustrates how ToM and interactionism can account for differ-
ent aspects of social cognition on different levels of description
and explanation. The arrows represent connections that we have
outlined in the current paper: (1) the possible reciprocal influ-
ence between Type 1 and Type 2 processes on the sub-personal
level; (2) the influence of supra-individual factors on Type 1
processes; (3) the correlations between Type 1 processes and
personal level descriptions; (4) the correlations between Type 2
processes and personal level descriptions19. In the next section we
consider several methodological implications for social cognitive
neurosciences.
THEORETICAL CONCERNS BECOME METHODOLOGICAL
CONCERNS
Originally the field of social psychology was aimed at understand-
ing how the behavior of people was influenced by the actual or
imagined presence of others (Allport, 1985). The work focused
mostly on individual behavior, but also developed paradigms
to understand the relations between groups. Later, due to the
19The arrows on Figure 1 depict only those explanatory relations that are
discussed in the current paper. The diagram allows to draw also other interest-
ing connections (e.g., between supra-individual factors and Type 2 processes,
or between supra-individual and individual level), but we do not discuss
them here.
cognitivist revolution, social cognitive processes also became a
topic of study. However, the studies initially focused on how the
individuals perceived others and rarely involved social interac-
tions. In sum, actual social interactions and their specific dynam-
ics were historically not a topic of study in the field of social
psychology. Given this theoretical background, it is not surprising
that the first social cognitive neuroscience studies did not involve
studies on social interactions. As we have argued, there are several
pressing theoretical arguments for studying social interactions. In
this section we discuss some of the methodological issues that
follow from the integrative framework.
SOCIAL COGNITION IN (INTER)ACTION
The interactionist critique addressing ToM is linked to a discus-
sion over what empirical methods should be adopted for doing
research on social cognition. Drawing on the discussions over
the importance of “third-person” mindreading versus “second-
person” engagement, interactionists insist that there is a need
to overcome the “methodological solipsism” (Macmurray, 1991;
Reddy and Morris, 2004) by complementing the purely observa-
tional methods with a “second-person”methodology (for a recent
proposal on the matter, see Schilbach et al., forthcoming).
An interactive aspect of communication is in fact already
inherent in standard “third-person” experiments. For example,
before an experiment officially begins, the experimenter inter-
acts with the test subject in order to explain what will happen
and what is expected from the test subject. As Gallagher (2008a,
p. 441) has pointed out, “even the youngest of the non-autistic
children tested interact with the experimenter, and tend to under-
stand what the experimenter wants them to do,” no matter
whether they pass the false belief task or not. This seems to be
a clear example of social understanding that goes without the
full package of mindreading. Yet, for a long time, the presence of
such social understanding remained largely unattended in social
cognition research.
Such examples illustrate the interactionist claim that engaged
social interactions are phenomenologically and cognitively differ-
ent from passive observations of others. Although the suggestions
for adopting a “second-person” methodology (experimenters
interacting with test subjects) may seem too radical or not suf-
ficiently rigorous to count as scientific, a less problematic way to
improve the methodology is to find new ways for studying sub-
jects while they are actively interacting during experiments rather
than testing single persons who passively receive social stimuli.
We hypothesize that studying social interactions in this manner
will also allow us to learn more about the interaction between
Type 1 and Type 2 processes. On many occasions, the division
of labor between cognitive and social psychology has been drawn
too sharply; both disciplines would gain from closer cooperation.
Within the neurosciences, social interactions have mostly been
studied using game theoretical paradigms (for review see Rilling
and Sanfey, 2011). Using these paradigms, neuroscientists have
been able to gain a tremendous amount of knowledge on cer-
tain aspects of social interactions, such as the development of
interpersonal trust (e.g., Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas et al.,
2005, 2008; van den Bos et al., 2009) and fairness-related behavior
(e.g. Sanfey et al., 2003; Knoch et al., 2006; Guroglu et al., 2010).
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FIGURE 1 | An integrative account of social cognition.
However, although economic games do capture some of the
dynamics of social interactions, they arguably come as close to
our everyday social interactions as correspondence chess—clearly
lacking many essential features of everyday social interactions.
Because of the rather detached stance and slow temporal dynam-
ics of these interactions, it is not surprising that the neuroimaging
data has revealed the consistent involvement of the mentaliz-
ing system in social interaction in economic games but, to our
knowledge, never the involvement of the MNS.
More recently, several research groups have developed novel
experimental paradigms that are specifically aimed at revealing
the neural correlates of the processes underlying social inter-
actions. One such study, designed by Schilbach and colleagues,
involved an interactive gaze following paradigm (Schilbach et al.,
2009). Interestingly, this study showed that, amongst other brain
networks, the ToMS (MPFC) plays an important role in these
real-time social interactions as well. Two other studies that
involved real-time social interactions, one involving imitation
(Guionnet et al., 2011) and the other the game of charades
(Schippers et al., 2009), revealed the simultaneous involvement
of the ToMS and MNS. As such, these results support the hypoth-
esis that ToMS and the MNS are both involved in our everyday
social interactions. However, these studies have not revealed any-
thing about the possible interaction between the ToMS andMNS.
In the next sections we will discuss several ways how we can build
upon these initial findings of interactive paradigms.
INTERACTION DYNAMICS
The richness of social interactions that make controlled experi-
ments so challenging also provides numerous new variables for
experimental manipulation. Some examples include: the tem-
poral dynamics of social interaction, degrees of coordination
between participators, the nature, and history of the relation
between participants (strangers/acquaintances/friends, etc.), the
directness or mediation of contact, behavioral factors (body
postures, gestures, eye-contact, etc.), experiential characteristics,
or the mode of interaction (cooperative vs. competitive). For
instance, cooperative vs. competitive social interactions are phe-
nomenologically very different: cooperative interactions often feel
effortless, whereas competition can be much more mentally tax-
ing. To what extent do the relative contributions of Type 2 and
Type 1 processes in cooperative vs. competitive contexts differ?
What occurs when there is a shift from a cooperative to an antago-
nistic encounter? Or how might one’s reputation (as a cooperator
or non-cooperator) affect basic motor coordination processes?
Although some of these questions can be answered usingmethods
that have been traditionally used in the social cognitive neuro-
science, the analyses of social interaction dynamics may require
new methods, for example those used in dynamical systems anal-
yses (De Jaegher, 2006, p. 87). For instance, simple oscillator
models can be used to account for the potential coupling of
physiological response patterns from two people during an inter-
action task (Helm et al., 2011). The couplings represent the degree
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of correspondence between the time series of both individu-
als, and this feature makes these models able to test hypotheses
about physiological or behavioral interdependence within differ-
ent types of relationships. As such, the novel variables generated
by these models may reveal more about both social behavior and
the underlying neural processes (For excellent examples of such
novel interaction paradigms, see Auvray and Rhode, 2012; Lenay
and Stewart, 2012, this issue).
CONNECTIVITY
Another challenge is to understand the putative roles of the ToMS
and MNS processes in social interactions, and importantly the
interaction between these processes. As we have pointed out,
previous imaging studies have revealed the involvement of both
systems, but have provided little insight in their possible interac-
tion. Here we think that connectivity analyses20 may reveal more
about the interaction between different brain systems. Using dif-
ferent statistical methods, it is possible to discover whether there is
stronger connectivity, or stronger correlation in patterns of activ-
ity, between different areas in the brain during different epochs
of a social interaction. For instance, these methods might reveal
that in the initial phase of a social interaction there is stronger
coupling between the ToMS and MNS than in later phases of the
interaction (or the other way around). However, given the cor-
relational nature of these analyses, they are not able to inform
us about the directionality of the supposed flow of informa-
tion. Other, more sophisticated methods such as Dynamic Causal
Modeling (DCM) or Granger Causality modeling (GC)21, allow
for stronger inferences about the influence of one brain area on
the activity of another (for overview of methods see Stephan and
Roebroeck, 2012). Together these techniques may provide more
insight in questions on the how and where of bottom-up biasing
and top-down modulation of the MNS and ToMS, respectively.
For instance, using these techniques we can figure out whether in
some situations the ToMS directly modulates the pSTS, involved
in processing biological motion (which then feeds into the MNS)
or whether it directly modulates the MNS.
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
Finally, developmental studies provide unique opportunities to
see how the MNS and ToMS interact in ways that are not typi-
cal for adults when they are fully matured (De Haan and Gunnar,
20Connectivity analyses are statistical methods that are aimed at understand-
ing how the activity in one brain area (X) is related to another brain area (Y).
One simple way of analyzing a possible relationship is to look at the correla-
tion between time-series of areas X and Y. This is somewhat comparable of
comparing how the index of different financial markets changes over time,
and how the rises and falls of those indexes are correlated. In neuroimaging
experiments, connectivity analyses are often aimed at testing whether the cor-
relation between brain areas is affected by psychological states. Such analyses
could for instance test whether there is a stronger connectivity between areas
X and Y when someone observes a congruent or an incongruent action.
21DCM and GC are tools for testing different models of “causal” relationships
between activities in multiple brain areas. As with other connectivity analy-
ses, this involves the statistical analyses between time-series of different brain
areas. The main idea is that a “causal” relation is assumed between X an Y
when it is possible to predict changes in the time series of brain area Y based
on what happens earlier in the time-series of X.
2009; Decety, 2010). Recent research on the development of social
cognition has shown that the components of the ToMS still show
developmental changes until late adolescence (Blakemore, 2008;
Burnett and Blakemore, 2009; Guroglu et al., 2011; van den Bos
et al., 2011). Furthermore, one such study revealed that the con-
nectivity within the ToMS also develops until late adolescence
(Burnett and Blakemore, 2009). Taken together, this suggests that
studies of the developmental changes in the interaction between
the ToMS and the MNS may provide novel insights in the neu-
robiological mechanisms underlying social interactions. This will
help us better understand the neural processes that underpin
social interactions in adults and can also provide insight in the
aetiology of developmental disorders such as autism.
SUMMARY
In this paper, we have characterized two rival approaches in the
current social cognition research: the traditional ToM approach
and the recently emerged, fast developing interactionist approach.
Whereas ToM has been focusing on studying “third-person” min-
dreading (i.e., how people attribute mental states to others in
order to explain and predict their behavior from a third-person
point of view), interactionism insists on a radical turn toward
focusing on “second-person” online interactions instead, claim-
ing that the ToM accounts should be discarded in favor of more
embodied and supra-individual explanations. We have argued
that although it is common to view these two approaches as
mutually exclusive, and indeed, they are to some extent based
on contrasting philosophical assumptions, it is more fruitful to
try to integrate them into a comprehensive theoretical frame-
work instead. In order to develop new research questions and
hypotheses from the integrative ToM-interactionist framework,
we drew upon dual process theories of social cognition that con-
trast two different types of social cognitive processing. The first
type (labeled Type 1) refers to processes that are fast, efficient,
stimulus-driven, and relatively inflexible, and the second type
(labeled Type 2) refers to processes that are relatively slow, cog-
nitively laborious, flexible, and may involve conscious control. By
comparing the ToM vs. interactionism debate with the dual pro-
cess accounts, we proposed that interactionism captures types of
social behavior based mostly on Type 1 processes, whereas ToM is
more focused on those based on Type 2 processes. Furthermore,
by suggesting that real life social interactions are rarely based
on either Type 1 or Type 2 processes alone, we hypothesized
that in most cases both processes are simultaneously involved
and presumably also interact. Consequently, ToM and interac-
tionism are relevant for studying different albeit related aspects
of social interaction. Finally, we discussed some methodologi-
cal implications derived from this new integrative framework,
suggesting that studies in social cognitive neuroscience may ben-
efit from investigating (1) the interaction of the Type 1 and
Type 2 processes, and (2) developing experimental paradigms
that are able to capture the dynamics of our everyday social
interactions.
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